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The very finality of the death penalty would seem to necessitate the
possibility of mercy.' Mercy, which encompasses the discretion of deci-
sion-makers at every stage of the death penalty process, has been eroded
by politics and an increasingly bureaucratized capital punishment system.
Mercy's demise can be seen particularly in the actions of governors and
juries, who have been discouraged from exercising merciful discretion. Yet
a host of constitutional, legal, and public policy factors, as well as humane
intuitions, argue that mercy must play a central role in any capital pun-
ishment scheme. A merciful instauration in the context of the modern
death penalty will require both a renewed commitment on the part of
public leaders and strengthened institutional supports for the practice of
mercy.' This Note proposes a revival of mercy through the actions of
courts, legislatures, and governors.
1. This Note uses the term "mercy" to refer to the larger category of "compassion or forbearance
shown . . . to an offender," WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 713 (1981), of which exec-
utive clemency and jury, judicial, and prosecutorial discretion to lessen punishment are subsets. One
legal philosopher has further described mercy as "an autonomous moral virtue (i.e., not reducible to
some other virtue-especially justice) [and as] a virtue that tempers or 'seasons' justice-something
one adds to justice (the primary virtue) to dilute it and perhaps, if one takes the metallurgical meta-
phor of tempering seriously, to make it stronger." Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in FORGIVE-
NESS AND MERCY 166 (1988).
Grants of mass clemency do not strictly fall within this description of mercy. Blanket commutations
are better characterized as decisions about the justice of capital punishment rather than instances of
empathy for individuals. See generally Black, Governors' Dilemma: May They Commute All Death
Sentences?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 28, 1979, at 12 (governors should grant mass clemency when
they believe death penalty is unconstitutional).
2. It has been argued that the executive should be given an increased role in reviewing death
sentences, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY
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In addition to political and bureaucratic factors that have worked to
discourage mercy, the ongoing conceptual debate over the relationship be-
tween mercy and justice has contributed to mercy's decline.3 Some schol-
ars have distinguished mercy from justice by noting that mercy inheres in
individuals, while justice is a function of institutions, and that mercy is
necessarily arbitrary and inconsistent. 5 Mercy has often been seen as ei-
ther subordinate to justice-filling in the gaps left by particular instantia-
tions of due process-or as superior and external to the justice yielded by
due process.6 Viewing mercy as one aspect of justice, however, reduces it
106-07 (1987), and that executive clemency should be accompanied by greater due process protec-
tions, see Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital Clemency Proceed-
ings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 905-11 (1981). The literature, however, is devoid of solutions to the more
fundamental problem of how to encourage clemency-granting authorities to be merciful, in the face of
the political unpopularity of executive clemency decisions and the unwillingness of many courts to
allow juries to exercise merciful discretion.
3. Situating the concept of mercy in relation to that of justice has occupied philosophers since at
least the time of Saint Anselm. In Chapter IX of his Proslogion, Anselm presents the paradox of a
just God showing mercy to the wicked, an unjust act by definition: "[W]hat kind of justice is it to give
everlasting life to him who merits eternal death? How then, 0 good God, good to the good and to the
wicked, how do You save the wicked if this is not just and You do not do anything which is not just?"
ST. ANSELM'S PROSLOGION 125-27 (M. Charlesworth trans. 1965); see also Murphy, supra note 1,
at 168-69.
As a matter of logic, however, mercy and justice are not mutually exclusive. Given that murderers
receive a broad range of punishments for comparable crimes across the several states, there is no
reason to view mercy as inimical to justice. "Huge as this country's death row population has become,
it does not include-and has never included-more than a tiny fraction of those who are convicted of
murder." Bruck, Decisions of Death: The Lottery of Capital Punishment is Rigged by Race, THE
NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1983, at 18. That the death penalty is rarely imposed implies that one
could never claim that any given murderer "deserves" anything more than a life sentence. Assuming
that justice is achieved when murderers receive what they deserve, there can be no conflict between
justice and mercy: even murderers to whom mercy is extended receive life sentences, and that is noth-
ing less than what they deserve. "[T]here are disjunctive deserts: disjunctions of penalties each of
which alone can serve as a sufficient desert for the improper act in question. . .. [T]o act mercifully
is to act in accord with justice since the merciful person gives someone what is deserved." Hestevold,
Disjunctive Desert, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 357, 360-61 (1983) (emphasis in original). In other words,
because the criminal justice system is already "unfair" in that it imposes disparate sentences on mur-
derers convicted of essentially similar crimes, mercy-by changing particular outcomes of due pro-
cess-does not introduce the element of unfairness into the system.
4. At least one author has argued that mercy is a "moral response characteristic of justice as a
virtue of persons who have the right to punish, although it is not part of the justice of the institution
of punishment in so far as that institution is defined by rules delineating rights in accord with princi-
ples of social justice." Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL. REV. 182, 182 (1972) (emphasis in original). Card
explains that John Rawls' notion of justice as fairness refers only to justice as a function of social
institutions. Card makes a distinction between "social justice" and "personal justice" and includes
mercy within the latter, thus viewing mercy as contained within the idea of justice but different from
even-handedness. Id. at 188-89.
5. "[T]here must be a certain arbitrariness to mercy: sometimes an agent can show mercy and
other times not with respect to the same improper action. . . . The fair but arbitrary tempering of
deserved suffering can only be possible if there are disjunctions of sufficient deserts some of which are
more severe than others." Hestevold, supra note 3, at 362 (emphasis in original). Hestevold argues
that, if mercy were consistent, it would become obligation: non-arbitrary mercy would require that all
future cases be pardoned when one person is pardoned. However, the motive for these future pardons
would be the precedent of the earlier pardon, rather than compassion. Id. at 361-62; see also N.
MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 180 (1982) ("[M]ercy cannot be precisely quantified
and institutionalized or it ceases to be mercy and becomes leniency .... ").
6. In a modern day example, Professor Welsh White-by questioning whether the Georgia Board
of Pardons was bound by the Supreme Court's determination that capital punishment is an inappro-
priate penalty for the crime of rape-has criticized the Board for denying clemency to Roosevelt
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to a redundancy: it is no longer freely given; it is no longer a function of
compassion." Mercy must be seen as "injustice"; mercy must stand outside
and above justice, contemplating death sentences from a perspective exter-
nal to the norms of due process, in order to satisfy the intuition that judi-
cial norms may not always suffice in fixing a punishment as difficult as
death.
I. THE TRADITION OF MERCY
Mercy is an ancient concept that has a long and venerable tradition in
religion,' philosophy,9 literature,' ° and the criminal law." The tradition
of mercy was implemented in North America through the pardon author-
ity of the colonial governors,' 2 and, later, the discretion of juries to recom-
mend mercy. Although few colonies allowed royal governors unfettered
Green. W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES 127 (1987). Green had raped a woman
but did not participate in her subsequent murder. Id. White's criticism reflects the view that mercy
should be exercised to fulfill the assurances of due process, not necessarily to enlarge or supersede
justice. Responding to White, Ernest van den Haag, an advocate of the death penalty, maintains that
mercy "is left to the conscience of the authority entitled to consider pleas which is not bound by court
decisions meant to do justice." Van den Haag, Book Review, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 609 (1988)
(reviewing W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES (1987)).
7. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 1, at 169 ("Illf we simply use the term 'mercy' to refer to certain
of the demands of justice (e.g., the demand for individuation), then mercy ceases to be an autonomous
virtue and instead becomes a part of (is reducible to a part of) justice.").
8. See, e.g., Savoy, The Spiritual Nature of Equality: Natural Principles of Constitutional Law,
28 HOWARD L.J. 809, 818-20 (1985) (discussing mercy as equitable supervention of law in Kabal-
lah, Jewish mystical tradition); Luke 15:11-32 (prodigal son parable illustrating mercy and merits of
uneven punishment); THE ASCETICAL HOMILIES OF SAINT ISAAC THE SYRIAN 244 (Holy Transfig-
uration Monastery trans. 1984) ("Mercy and justice in one soul is like a man who worships God and
the idols in one house . . .. [Mlercy belongs to the portion of righteousness[;] justice belongs to the
portion of wickedness."); JOHN PAUL II, DiVES IN MISERICORDIA (1980) (papal encyclical on virtues
of mercy; "mercy differs from justice, but is not in opposition to it"), quoted in N. MORRIS, supra
note 5, at 156.
9. See, e.g., SENECA, On Clemency, in THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY OF SENECA 137, 138 (M. Hadas
trans. 1958) (urging rulers to use mercy liberally; "One man's youth sways me, another's age; one
man I have reprieved for his eminence, another for his insignificance; and when I found no other
ground for pity I have shown charity to myself."); 5 E. BURKE, THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 285 (H. Frowde ed. 1920) ("Mercy is not a thing opposed to justice.
It is an essential part of it: as necessary in criminal cases, as in civil affairs equity is to law.").
10. See, e.g., W. LANGLAND, PIERS THE PLOWMAN (M. Williams trans. 1971) (morality poem
concerning, in part, need for justice before mercy); M. STOKES, JUSTICE AND MERCY IN PIERS
PLOWMAN 273-75 (1984) (Langland considered mercy unjust when unaccompanied by expiation and
repentance); W. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE Act IV, Scene 1 ("The quality of mercy
is not strain'd, / It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven / Upon the place beneath: / it is twice
blest; / It blesseth him that gives and him that takes . .."), quoted in M. ANDREWS, LAW VERSUS
EQUITY IN THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 7 & n.36 (1965); J. MILTON, Paradise Lost, Book X, in 2
THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 307 (F. Patterson ed. 1931) ("temper . . . Justice with Mercie").
11. See, e.g., An Act for Recontinuing Liberties in the Crown, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 24 (vesting
exclusive prerogative of mercy in King of England); Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of the Pardon in
England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 51, 52-55 (1963) (mercy prerogative of English kings extant since
at least eighth century); Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law in ALBION'S FATAL TREE:
CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 40-44 (1975) (although mercy formally
vested in Crown, judges and aristocracy also exercised prerogative in 1700's).
12. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 895-98 (discussing historical role of clemency in capital
punishment system).
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discretion to grant mercy,1" in the new republic state constitutions nor-
mally vested the mercy prerogative solely in the governor. 4 In the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, abuses of the pardon power'5 led some
states to require pardons to be approved jointly by the governor and a
board of pardons. At present, of the states with the death penalty, twenty-
two confer an exclusive clemency power on the governor, while fifteen use
a pardon board or other body to check the executive. 6
The nineteenth century also witnessed the abolition of mandatory capi-
tal punishment statutes and the rise of absolute jury sentencing discretion
in capital cases, which included the discretion to be merciful. This discre-
tion was a response to jury nullification of mandatory capital sentences in
circumstances in which leniency seemed appropriate and also may have
been motivated by a desire to institutionalize local racial sentiment in the
application of criminal punishments.'
7
At least until recently, the exercise of mercy was not delimited by the
judicial process. Jurors were allowed to consider any factor in mitigation
of capital punishment, including mercy and compassion for the defend-
ant,"' and governors could weigh reasons for granting clemency that tran-
scended legal categories.' 9 Under formerly-prevailing conceptions of who
13. All but five of the colonies required the concurrence of an executive council to grant a pardon,
and cases of treason and premeditated murder needed the Crown's assent for pardon. See Note, Exec-
utive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 136, 140-41 (1964).
14. Id. at 141.
15. For example, between 1915 and 1917, Texas Governor James Ferguson granted 1,774 par-
dons. Id. at 141 n.25.
16. In discussing the commutation of sentences, this Note will generally refer only to the power of
governors, because governors (as opposed to pardon boards) have the final clemency discretion in 22 of
the 37 death penalty states, and there have been no recent Federal death sentences. Arizona, Dela-
ware, Florida, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and
Texas require the concurrence of a cabinet or board of pardons in order for a governor to grant a
commutation. Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, and Utah vest complete power to commute sentences in a
board of pardons. All other death penalty states leave the mercy prerogative in the sole discretion of
the governor. S. STAFFORD, CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE, AND STRUCTURE 7-90
(1977).
17. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) (noting rise of jury capital sentencing discretion); W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE:
DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 10-11 & Table 1-2 (1981) (jury capital discretion dates);
Bedau Background and Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 9-12 (H. Bedau 3d
ed. 1982) (history of transition from mandatory to discretionary jury capital sentencing).
18. One representative early capital statute vested the power of mercy exclusively in the jury's
hands in Federal murder and rape trials. Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, § 21, 29 Stat. 487 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1982)). Interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court reversed a mur-
der conviction in which the jury instructions informed the jury that they were not to recommend
mercy unless they found one of the mitigating circumstances: "How far considerations of. . . sympa-
thy or clemency. . . should be allowed weight in deciding the question whether the accused should or
should not be capitally punished, is committed by the act of Congress to the sound discretion of the
jury, and of the jury alone." Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 313 (1899); see also McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-203 (1971) (discussing Winston and history of discretionary jury
capital sentencing), vacated on other grounds, Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
19. Courts have been clear that the use of the clemency power for whatever reason, extra-legal or
even illegal, is not reviewable. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla.) ("[T]he people
of this state chose to vest sole, unrestricted, unlimited discretion exclusively in the executive in exercis-
ing this act of grace."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977); People v. Herrera, 183 Colo. 155, 516 P.2d
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might exercise mercy, then, juries and governors were free to be as
merciful as conscience dictated.
II. THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF MERCY
Despite this tradition, unfolding events in United States politics and
death penalty jurisprudence are frustrating the exercise of mercy. Execu-
tive clemency, the vehicle through which governors may show mercy, has
become unavailable in practice, largely as a result of the popularity of the
death penalty. The Supreme Court has permitted judges to limit the sen-
tencing discretion of juries by allowing them to instruct jurors not to act
out of mercy, sympathy, or compassion for capital defendants.20 This limi-
tation of jury discretion is symptomatic of the current Court's effort to
formalize and streamline death penalty procedure.21 Judges and prosecu-
tors, as part of the same process that mercy is meant to override, are
structurally prevented from being merciful decision-makers.
A. Executive Mercy
The exercise of executive clemency for capital defendants has fallen into
desuetude since the death penalty was reinstated in the United States by
Gregg v. Georgia.22 For example, prior to 1972, when the Supreme Court
banned executions imposed under then-existing death penalty statutes,23
some Florida governors commuted over thirty percent of all death
sentences. Since Gregg, Florida governors have granted clemency in only
eight percent of all cases.24 Nationally, the rate of commutations as com-
pared to executions has dropped significantly in the post-Gregg era.25
626 (1973) (governor's commutation power cannot be exercised by judiciary); Flavell's Case, 8 Watts
& Serg. 197, 199 (Pa. 1844) ("The propriety or wisdom of granting such pardons, or of the terms and
conditions annexed, must rest with the executive, to whom the constitution entrusts this authority.").
But see Note, supra note 2, at 894 n.19 (discussing possible constitutional limitations on clemency
power).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 34-53.
21. See, e.g., Rehnquist: Cut Jurisdiction, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 22-23 (Chief Justice Rehn-
quist suggests consolidation of all Federal collateral attacks on capital sentences in one petition,
thereby limiting successor habeas petitions).
22. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). Gregg approved Georgia's revised capital punish-
ment procedures. These procedures attempted to guide jury sentencing discretion through the use of a
two-stage trial in which guilt was first assessed, and then aggravating and mitigating circumstances
were weighed by jurors in determining whether a defendant should receive a life or death sentence.
Georgia's statute also provided for comparative proportionality review of all Georgia death sentences
by the state supreme court. Id. at 196-98. Most state capital statutes now follow procedures similar to
those upheld in Gregg. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at 21-24.
23. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (death penalty as applied violates
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
24. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Pen-
alty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797, 844 (1986); see also AMNI.STY INTER-
NATIONAL, supra note 2, at 102 n.4. Tabak notes that "while clemency traditionally was granted
frequently in appropriate cases, today the 'right' to consideration for clemency is more theoretical than
real." Tabak, supra, at 844 (citation omitted).
25. There have been over 100 executions and only 15 commutations of death sentences in the 13
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Clemency authorities repeatedly have relied on the accuracy of the legal
process afforded capital defendants to justify denials of clemency. Gover-
nors perceive their mercy prerogative as limited by the bounds of proce-
dure. Representative of this view is Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas,
who has said, "The appeals process, although lengthy, provides many op-
portunities for the courts to review sentences and that's where these deci-
sions should be made."
26
Political considerations have figured prominently in the unwillingness
of many governors to be merciful. The popularity of the death penalty
suggests to these officials that the safest course of action is to avoid the
exercise of their clemency powers.27 Prisoners scheduled to be executed
shortly before election day are particularly vulnerable to denials of
clemency.
28
Abdication of the executive clemency power in favor of the judicial
branch has been encouraged by the courts. Given the special procedures
and levels of review provided capital defendants since Gregg, some courts
have implied that any death sentence that can survive such hurdles should
be carried out, because arbitrariness and unfairness in the imposition of
capital punishment have been reduced by procedural guarantees.2" This
post-Gregg years. However, in the 17 years between 1946 and 1963, Georgia alone commuted 41
death sentences and executed 152, and in the 26 years between 1935 and 1961, Maryland commuted
35 death sentences and executed 61. Clemency Becoming Rare as Executions Increase, Corrections
Dig., July 8, 1987, at 4, col. 1; W. BOWERS, supra note 17, at 433-36, 447-48. Although there are,
of course, analytical difficulties in comparing such disparate jurisdictions and time periods, clemency
has been granted to 12% of those scheduled to die nationally since Gregg, whereas in the pre-Gregg
period Georgia granted clemency to 21% of the condemned and Maryland granted clemency to 36%.
Technically, there have been at least 49 commutations since Gregg; however, 35 of these resulted from
a provision in Texas law that requires the same jury to resentence a defendant if the original sentence
is overturned on appeal. The difficulty of reassembling juries usually has led the governor of Texas to
commute such sentences without passing on the merits of the application. Telephone interview with
Tanya Coke, NAACP Legal Defense Fund (Nov. 30, 1988) (notes on file with author); see also
Death Row: Few Lawyersfor Big Task, L.A. Times, Mar. 21, 1988, § 1, at 3, cols. 3-4 (commutation
statistics).
26. Clemency Becoming Rare as Executions Increase, supra note 25, at 2, col. 2. At the end of
Clinton's first term in office, he commuted a number of death sentences. After being defeated for
reelection in 1980, Clinton staged a comeback bid in 1982, promising "not to commute so many
sentences if . . .given another chance." Arkansas Gubernatorial Candidates in Close Race, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 27, 1982, at B10, col. 3. Similar statements by other governors abound. See, e.g., Riley
Wouldn't Stop Execution Out of 'Mercy', Columbia (S.C.) Record, Oct. 23, 1984, at 1, col. I ("I do
not think that I as governor should intervene in the process of capital cases unless I find that a
person's rights have not been afforded."); Statement of Tenn. Gov. Lamar Alexander (May 29, 1984)
(on file with author) ("For [five and one-half] years I have reviewed clemency petitions only for the
purpose of determining whether there might be a mistake or other extraordinary defect in certain
criminal proceedings.").
27. See Political Pressure Thwarts Clemency, Miami Herald, July 12, 1988, at 1, col. 4 (politics
discourages executive clemency); In Florida, a Story of Politics and Death: A Governor Controls the
Ultimate Sentence, Nat'l L.J., July 16, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (same).
28. See, e.g., Woman on Death Row Creates Political Stir in North Carolina, Boston Globe,
Sept. 7, 1984, at 2, col. 2 (possibility of clemency for Velma Barfield factor in 1984 Hunt-Helms U.S.
Senate race); Carolina Slayer Fails in Her Bid for a Reprieve, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1984, at Al,
col. 2 (Hunt denies clemency to Barfield); First Woman Is Executed in U.S. Since 1962, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 1984, at A46, col. 1 (Barfield executed four days before general election).
29. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984) (judge-imposed capital sentence con-
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judicial imprimatur serves to absolve other governmental actors from re-
sponsibility for independently evaluating death decisions."0
Several state legislatures have discussed proposals to limit or abolish
their governors' mercy powers."' Because the clemency power in those
states is derived from the state constitution, proposals have taken the form
of possible constitutional amendments. The catalyst for these proposals
has been the election of governors who oppose the death penalty and who
may be inclined to grant individual or mass clemencies to persons under
sentence of death. 2
In short, the voting public, courts, and legislatures all exert pressure on
state executives to relinquish the mercy prerogative. Further, executive
mercy has been viewed as merely ensuring that the rules of due process
have been obeyed.33 Given the degree of judicial review in capital cases,
such procedural error is unlikely. For all practical purposes, mercy is no
longer available from the executive branch.
B. Jury Mercy
At the time the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in the
United States," all jurisdictions allowed juries to exercise complete discre-
tion in sentencing, including the option to be merciful.3 5 The revised death
penalty regime instituted by the Supreme Court plurality in Gregg v.
Georgia envisioned that jurors would continue to possess substantial, if
guided, discretion in determining fit cases for mercy. 8 Other capital pun-
stitutional; "[Ilt is to be hoped that current procedures have greatly reduced the risk that jury sentenc-
ing will result in arbitrary or discriminatory application of the death penalty. .. ").
30. Prof. Robert Burt has warned of the dangers of allowing courts to preempt painful moral and
ethical conversations surrounding euthanasia and psychiatric commitment by substituting legal rules
for personal interaction and responsibility. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF
LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 144-73 (1979); see also Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983
Sup. CT. REV. 305, 392-93 (applying Burt's analysis to capital punishment). Weisberg writes that
"[tihe due process romanticism of the [death] penalty trial has enabled us to avoid acknowledging the
inevitably unsystematic, irreducibly personal moral elements of the choice to administer the death
penalty." Id. at 393.
31. See, e.g., Anaya Spares All Inmates on New Mexico Death Row, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 1986,
at 23, col. 1 (legislature considered withdrawing clemency power after governor mentioned possible
commutations); Leave Clemency Be, The State (Columbia, S.C.), Dec. 16, 1984, at 2-B, col. I (edito-
rial opposing legislative proposal to abolish executive clemency).
32. Toney Anaya, Governor of New Mexico from 1982 to 1986, and Dick Riley, Governor of
South Carolina from 1982 to 1986, both were opposed to the death penalty prior to their elections.
Anaya prevented executions during his term, while Riley felt compelled to allow executions to pro-
ceed. See sources cited supra note 31.
33. See supra text accompanying note 26.
34. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
35. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing rise of discretionary jury capital
sentencing).
36. "[T]he isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional death
sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced under a system that does not create a substantial
risk of arbitrariness or caprice." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203 (1976). Currently, the majority
of death penalty states allows juries to set punishment in capital cases. In Alabama, Florida, and
Indiana, jury sentencing verdicts are only recommendations to trial judges. California requires that
trial judges review jury sentences in capital cases but does not allow judges to overturn jury recom-
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ishment decisions prohibited states from excluding from the sentencer's
consideration anything that might serve "as a basis for a sentence less
than death."3
Yet this discretion has been held to exclude mercy. In California v.
Brown,8 the Court ruled that an instruction requiring jurors to ignore
"mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion
or public feeling"3 9 was not unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that
instructions cautioning a jury against relying on "mere sentiment" or
"sympathy" increase the reliability of sentencing determinations and allow
those sentences to be subjected to "meaningful judicial review."40
Jurors, in other words, are to rely only on testimony and exhibits
presented during the trial insofar as they relate to specific, rationally-
described, non-emotional aggravating and mitigating circumstances. They
may be told to avoid examining their emotions or consciences when mak-
ing sentencing decisions.4 '
Although anti-mercy instructions are not required, the Court's decision
in Brown allows imposition of the death penalty without juries having
considered a defendant's eligibility for mercy. Justice Blackmun, dissent-
ing in Brown, expressed his concern over this prospect:
mendations of life. When Nevada juries are not unanimous in their verdicts, three-judge panels deter-
mine sentences. Four states place capital sentencing exclusively in the hands of trial judges: Arizona,
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at 24. For a list of the
relevant statutes, see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 n.9 (1984). A defendant can, however,
usually waive the right to a jury trial. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930).
37. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (sentencer must consider all
relevant evidence in mitigation offered by capital defendant).
38. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
39. Id. at 542. The Court's determination that mercy is an inappropriate consideration for capital
juries was prefigured by Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985):
Despite the Court's rhetorical references to the need for "reliable" sentencing decisions ren-
dered by jurors that comprehend their "awesome responsibility," I do not understand the
Court to believe that emotions in favor of mercy must play a part in the ultimate decision of a
capital sentencing jury. Indeed, much of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been con-
cerned with eliminating emotion from sentencing decisions.
Id. at 349.
40. Brown, 479 U.S. at 542-43. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion stressed the importance of
informing capital juries of their "obligation to consider all of the mitigating evidence introduced by the
[defendant] ...." Id. at 546 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Her concurrence was predicated on the
opportunity for the lower court on remand to determine whether Brown's jury was in fact told of its
responsibility to weigh all of the mitigating evidence before it. O'Connor reached this conclusion by a
path far different from that of Chief Justice Rehnquist. The majority focused almost exclusively on
the unlikelihood that the modifier "mere" would have caused a sentencing jury to disregard some or
all of a defendant's evidence presented in mitigation. O'Connor's opinion was that, although emotion
should generally be excluded from sentencing considerations, id. at 545, nevertheless it was possible
that the trial court's instructions, "taken as a whole," id. at 546, were broad enough to preclude the
consideration of certain factors essential to the determination of culpability.
41. Prosecutors frequently claim that factors such as emotion or conscience are in the realm of
sympathy, and thus that jurors should not take them into consideration in sentencing. Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Brown suggests that anti-sympathy instructions effectively prevent consideration of
any mitigating evidence relating to defendants' backgrounds or character. Id. at 553-55 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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In my view, we adhere so strongly to our belief that sentencers
should have the opportunity to spare a capital defendant's life on
account of compassion for the individual because . . . we see in the
sentencer's expression of mercy a distinctive feature of our society
that we deeply value.
In the real world, as in this case, it perhaps is unlikely that one
word in an instruction would cause a jury totally to disregard miti-
gating factors that the defendant has presented through specific testi-
mony. When, however, a jury member is moved to be merciful to the
defendant, an instruction telling the juror that he or she cannot be"swayed" by sympathy well may arrest or restrain this humane re-
sponse, with truly fatal consequences for the defendant. This possi-
bility I cannot accept . *.4..2
Prior to Brown, state supreme courts were divided over the question of
instructions that precluded juries from considering mercy in their deliber-
ations. Three states refused to allow juries to be instructed to ignore
mercy."' Most jurisdictions, however, allowed mercy to be excluded from
the consideration of jurors even before the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown."" At least seven states have since explicitly endorsed the exclusion
of mercy from the consideration of capital juries. 5 In short, the decision
in Brown encourages trial judges to instruct juries not to consider mercy,
sympathy, or compassion during their sentencing deliberations.
The status of mercy within capital sentencing schemes continues to at-
tract the attention of the Justices. Recently the Court granted certiorari on
a case that may further elucidate the import of Brown. In Parks v.
Brown,"' the Tenth Circuit held that the following anti-sympathy instruc-
tion violated the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights: "You must avoid
42. Id. at 562-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
43. These states were California, Georgia, and Washington. See People v. Lanphear, 36 Cal. 3d
163, 165-66, 680 P.2d 1081, 1082-83, 203 Cal. Rptr. 122, 123-24 (1984); Legare v. State, 250 Ga.
875, 877-78, 302 S.E.2d 351, 353-54 (1983); State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 754, 718 P.2d 407,
443, cert. denied, 478 U.S. 885 (1986).
44. "No sympathy" jurisdictions included Illinois, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.
See People v. Neal, 111 Ill. 2d 180, 201-02, 489 N.E.2d 845, 853-54 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1165 (1986); Nevius v. State, 101 Nev. 238, 250-51, 699 P.2d 1053, 1060-61 (1985); State v. Scott,
26 Ohio St. 3d 92, 108, 497 N.E.2d 55, 68 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 923 (1987); Parks v. State,
651 P.2d 686, 693-94 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); State v. Chaffee,
285 S.C. 21, 32, 328 S.E.2d 464, 470 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985).
45. See People v. Williams, 45 Cal. 3d 1268, 1322-23, 756 P.2d 221, 253, 248 Cal. Rptr. 834,
866 (1988) (refusal to give jury instruction emphasizing pity, mercy, and sympathy not unconstitu-
tional), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 883 (1989); People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 522 N.E.2d 1167, 1179
(1988) (no-sympathy instruction not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3260 (1989); State v.
Copeland, 530 So. 2d 526, 537 (La. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1558 (1989); State v.
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 296-99, 524 A.2d 188, 275-77 (1987) (same); Commonwealth v. Clayton,
516 Pa. 263, 281, 532 A.2d 385, 394 (1987) (not necessary for jury to consider "mere sympathy"),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1098 (1988); State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161, 169, 359 S.E.2d 275, 279 (no-
sympathy instruction not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 496 (1987); State v. Porterfield,
746 S.W.2d 441, 450-51 (Tenn.) (same), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1756 (1988).
46. 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Saffle v. Parks, 109 S. Ct. 1930
(Apr. 24, 1989) (No. 88-1264).
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any influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice or other arbi-
trary factor when imposing sentence." 7 The circuit court distinguished
this instruction from that given in Brown, relying principally on the dis-
tinction between the qualifier "mere" used in Brown and the qualifier
"any" used in Parks.4 8 The court interpreted the anti-sympathy instruc-
tion at issue as an absolute bar to jury consideration of any sympathetic
factors. This prohibition might have prevented consideration of many mit-
igating circumstances, in violation of the requirement set forth in Lockett
v. Ohio49 that no mitigating evidence be precluded from capital sentencing
deliberations."
Given the majority's focus in Brown on the importance of the phrase
"mere sympathy"51 and Justice O'Connor's emphasis in her Brown con-
currence on the need for jury consideration of the totality of mitigating
evidence offered by defendants on trial for their lives,5 2 it seems that the
Court would be bound by precedent to uphold the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion. If, however, the Court reverses Parks, it will signal a significant
retreat from Lockett and its progeny. In the interests of such bureaucratic
norms as predictability of results and formal rationality, jurors will be
allowed to sentence defendants to death without having considered "all
relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender." 3
The Court will also send the unmistakable message that mercy, sympathy,
and emotion can be safely driven out of the death penalty process.
47. 860 F.2d at 1552 & n.8.
48. Id. at 1553.
49. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
50. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1554. The court of appeals also reasoned that including "sympathy" in a
list of clearly impermissible factors would cause jurors to discount sympathetic mitigating factors. Id.
The lower courts have taken varying approaches to the issue of mercy within capital sentencing. See
Britz v. Illinois, 109 S. Ct. 1100, 1102 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of grant of certio-
rari) (noting division in lower courts); People v. Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d 123, 152 & n.7, 249 Cal. Rptr.
320, 336 & n.7, 756 P.2d 1348, 1364-65 & n.7 (no-sympathy instruction should not be given in
capital cases), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1176 (1989). But see State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 910
(Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 380 (1988) (anti-sympathy instruction constitutional). The
Fifth Circuit has interpreted Brown broadly. In Byrne v. Butler, 847 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1988), that
court held constitutional an instruction generally prohibiting the considertion of sympathy given with-
out the modifier "mere." See id. at 1139-40. In a somewhat puzzling display of logic, Byrne reasoned
that, because the trial court judge instructed the jury to ignore sympathy following the summations of
both the prosecution and the defense, the judge was correctly attempting to prevent jury consideration
of non-legal factors. See id. at 1140. However, forbidding sympathy for both the victim and the de-
fendant will only have the effect of focusing the jury's attention on the statutory aggravating circum-
stances on the one hand and away from the statutory mitigating circumstances, many of which involve
elements of sympathy, on the other. See also supra note 41.
51. Brown, 479 U.S. at 541-43; see also id. at 542 ("By concentrating on the noun 'sympathy,'
respondent [Brown] ignores the crucial fact that the jury was instructed to avoid basing its decision on
mere sympathy.").
52. Id. at 544-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). Earlier, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976), held that the "character and record of the individual offender.., is a constitution-




The very nature of the judicial office prevents judges from exercising
mercy, if by mercy one means anything more than securing procedurally
correct impositions of the death penalty. Although practices vary by juris-
diction, trial court judges occasionally have the authority to decline to im-
pose death sentences recommended by juries." However, this decision
must usually be justified either by a determination that the aggravating
factors did not, as a matter of law, outweigh the mitigating factors, or that
the jury weighed extraneous factors in making its sentencing decision.55
Similarly, when judges determine sentences in capital cases without the
aid of a jury, their discretion is often bounded by the evidence pertaining
to aggravating or mitigating circumstances.56 Such bounded discretion
does not constitute mercy, because it cannot take into consideration extra-
legal reasons for forgoing capital punishment. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that appellate court judges are poorly situated to consider
"the mercy plea [which] is made directly to the jury"; 57 an appellate rec-
ord is insufficient to allow such judges to take into account "[w]hatever
intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination."58
Further, both trial and appellate court judges have a mindset that is not
well-suited to applying the equitable concept of mercy.59 It simply may be
impossible for judges to apply procedural rules with one hand and to be
merciful with the other: given human psychology, rules normally will
trump the much vaguer notion of mercy. Such rules squeeze out the essen-
tially personal, compassionate element inherent in being merciful.
Courts may also not have the institutional self-confidence to overturn
death sentences for non-legal reasons. Judicial recognition of the essen-
tially anti-majoritarian nature of the judicial branch60 has made judges
hesitant to overturn the decisions of juries (as representatives of the pol-
ity)61 solely on the basis of personal predilection or intuition. The defer-
54. See supra note 36.
55. For example, when reassessing jury death verdicts, California trial judges "shall review the
evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
• ..and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravat-
ing circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence
presented." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Supp. 1987), which requires the finding of at least one
aggravating circumstance before a person convicted of a capital crime can be considered for death.
"Where the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance the court shall sentence the defendant to
death unless the court finds that mitigating circumstances which may be presented outweigh the grav-
ity of any aggravating circumstance found and make imposition of death unjust." Id. at § 19-2515(c).
57. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985).
58. Id. at 331.
59. See generally M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
265-66 (1977) (noting how merger of law and equity initiated by New York Field Code of 1848 led
to triumph of putatively amoral formalism in legal reasoning).
60. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing anti-majoritarianism of courts).
61. See, e.g., J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 231 (1988) (concluding that juries play
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ence shown to jury determinations in other substantive areas of law also
makes it difficult to overcome that deference and to conduct a true de novo
review of verdicts.
D. Prosecutorial Mercy
Though some prosecutors may exercise mercy on behalf of some capital
defendants, the nature of a prosecutor's job makes it impossible for her to
empathize with the vast bulk of defendants. 2 By definition, prosecutors
are not capable of exercising mercy: Prosecutorial discretion is exercised at
the beginning of the capital punishment process, and many factors go into
a prosecutor's decision to prosecute that do not necessarily concern the
mercifulness of a possible sentence, such as the likelihood of conviction on
a particular charge or public pressure for bringing a capital case.6 3 Fur-
ther, the prosecutor's role in sentencing is limited to making recommenda-
tions to the sentencing authority; prosecutors thus have little or no discre-
tion to exercise mercy at that stage.
In sum, the institutions that are equipped to be merciful are not per-
forming that function. Mercy has been blocked by the reluctance of gover-
nors to exercise their clemency powers and by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion that mercy is not a necessary consideration for capital juries.
III. THE NEED FOR MERCY
The thesis of this Note is that mercy, as a concept and as a practice, no
longer plays the role it once did in the capital punishment system. Mercy
is nevertheless very much needed; without it: (1) the Constitution is vio-
lated; (2) consideration of non-legal factors is thwarted; (3) systemic ef-
fects of racism in sentencing, which cannot be seen in individual cases, are
allowed to persist; (4) sentences are imposed without reference to
sentences imposed for similar crimes; and (5) our public life is increas-
ingly bureaucratized and dehumanized.
A. Constitutional Mercy
The Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence is predicated
upon the existence and active use of the mercy prerogative: Although the
Court recently has implied that juries are not necessarily appropriate ve-
important role in maintenance of democracy).
62. But see Friedman, Discretion and Public Prosecution, in THE INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM:
DISCRETION AND THE LAW 70 (B. Atkins & M. Pogrebin eds., 2d ed. 1982) (arguing that
prosecutorial discretion is frequently merciful).
63. William Bowers has argued that the Gregg guidelines have actually increased the influence of
extra-legal factors such as race and class on the decisions of prosecutors to prosecute, by allowing
prosecutors the latitude to "upcharge" aggravating factors against minority defendants. W. BowERs,
supra note 17, at 340-48; see also Tabak, supra note 24, at 799-800 (prosecutors charge capital
crimes to win re-election, make convictions easier, induce plea bargains).
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hicles for mercy,6 it has consistently supported the exercise of mercy by
the executive. The constitutional imperative of substantive clemency re-
view can be seen through an analysis of proposals designed to delimit
clemency. 5 This Note argues that if a state or the Federal government
were to eliminate executive clemency by constitutional amendment or oth-
erwise, no death sentences could be carried out in that jurisdiction.
First, the constitutional preference for clemency results from the plural-
ity's implicit assumption in Gregg v. Georgia that clement discretion
would be available to persons under sentence of death. Responding to
Troy Gregg's argument that a death penalty process that allowed gover-
nors, juries, and prosecutors to exempt defendants from punishment was
capricious, the Court described executive clemency as one of the discre-
tionary practices the absence of which would create a system "totally alien
to our notions of criminal justice."'66 The Court thus suggested that execu-
tive clemency would play as vital a role in the revitalized death penalty
jurisprudence as jury and prosecutorial discretion.67 In approving the
death penalty, the Justices apparently assumed that some extra-judicial
body (namely state governors) would examine death sentences to ensure
that courts have not made gross errors in sentencing, errors that may be
apparent only from an extra-legal perspective.
A second, related point is that although the Supreme Court has not
otherwise ruled on the need for gubernatorial clemency review,68 and the
Court's cases that do discuss clemency focus on the presidential clemency
power," a consistent jurisprudence also would require substantive clem-
64. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987); see also text accompanying notes 34-51.
65. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (proposals to abolish clemency).
66. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976). Moreover, "In the federal system it also would be
unconstitutional to prohibit a President from deciding, as an act of executive clemency, to reprieve one
sentenced to death." Id. Likewise, the constitutions of all but six states contain provisions granting the
executive branch the power of clemency. The other states-Alaska, Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana,
North Dakota, and Tennessee-vest the executive's clemency power statutorily. See S. STAFFORD,
supra note 16, at 7-90.
67. The plurality also defended the ad hoc and possibly arbitrary power of such discretionary
exemptions, including executive clemency, to lessen sentences, stating that "[n]othing in any of our
cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution." 428
U.S. at 199. But compare Justice White's dissent in the connected case of Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976):
As for executive clemency, I cannot assume that this power, exercised by governors and vested
in the President by Art. II, § 2, of the Constitution, will be used in a standardless and arbi-
trary manner. . . . The country's experience with the commutation power does not suggest
that it is a senseless lottery, that it operates in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, or that it
will lead to reducing the death penalty to a merely theoretical threat that is imposed only on
the luckless few.
Id. at 349-50 (White, J., dissenting).
68. Since Gregg, the Supreme Court has discussed the power of executive clemency in capital
cases only once, and then in terms of whether the clemency review procedures of the governor of
Florida were sufficient to determine if a capitally-sentenced prisoner was mentally ill. Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (determination of sanity by governor unconstitutional).
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, vests the power "to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment" in the President. The Court's decisions
discussing clemency have focused almost solely on presidential clemency. In Biddle v. Perovich, the
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ency review on the part of state executives because: (1) state courts have
long held gubernatorial clemency to be absolute and limitable only by
state constitutional amendment;70 and (2) given that clemency is conse-
quently an integral part of every state's capital punishment system, it
must serve some purpose besides simply certifying that no legal error has
occurred, which state and Federal appellate courts are adequately
equipped to do. Therefore, a purely process-oriented clemency is unconsti-
tutional in the death penalty context because courts on both the Federal
and state levels have assumed that clemency-granting authorities will
scrutinize capital cases on bases other than those that the courts use.
B. Consideration of Matters Not Admitted in Court
Mercy is needed because factors that courts do not consider may war-
rant life sentences, especially given the Supreme Court's assumption that
extra-judicial actors would review each case for mercy. For procedural
reasons, courts may refuse either to admit evidence in mitigation of pun-
ishment or to review meritorious claims on appeal. For example, local
Federal appellate court rules may require the immediate litigation of ap-
peals from Federal district courts that refuse to stay executions. The time
constraints faced by attorneys in such situations make introduction of new,
valid claims virtually impossible."
The execution of Willie Darden illustrates the dangers of relying solely
on the courts for justice tempered with mercy. Former Chief Justice Bur-
ger, in an unusual dissent from a grant of certiorari, complained that "[i]n
the twelve years since [Darden] was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death, the issues now raised in the petition for certiorari have been consid-
ered by this Court four times and have been passed upon no fewer than
[ninety-five] times by federal and state court judges." 72 Burger's implicit
Court held that pardons are an important avenue for implementing public policy: "[A pardon] is a
part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that
the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed." 274 U.S.
480, 486 (1927) (citation omitted). More recently, the commutation power was described as "a 'pre-
rogative' of the President, which ought not be 'fettered or embarrassed.'" Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S.
256, 263 (1974) (conditional commutation of Federal death sentence held constitutional) (quoting
ThE FEDERALISr No. 74, at 500-01 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961)).
70. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Pardon and Parole § 31 (1987); supra note 19.
71. See, e.g., Tabak, supra note 24, at 835-38 (discussing execution of Johnny Taylor, whose
lawyer was unable to present ineffectiveness of counsel claim because of time constraints).
72. Darden v. Wainwright, 473 U.S. 928, 929 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from grant of
certiorari). According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "the flaw in the present system is not that capital
sentences are set aside by Federal courts, but that litigation ultimately resolved in favor of the state
literally takes years and years and years." Rehnquist: Cut Jurisdiction, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 23.
The circular reasoning evinced in statements such as these-that people without ultimately valid
claims should be executed expeditiously-fails to acknowledge the possibility that exculpatory evi-
dence may come to light after the defendant's original trial. See, e.g., Death Row Takes on a Higher
Profile, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at AIO, col. 3 (discussing commutation or reversal of death
sentence in Ronald Monroe's, Randall Dale Adams', and James Richardson's cases; "[I1n recent years
serious questions about guilt or innocence have surfaced with increasing frequency."). The argument
also fails to account for the fact that a long process is required to determine meritorious claims in any
[Vol. 99: 389
1989] Reviving Mercy 403
assumption was that, simply because Darden had received numerous ap-
peals, Darden's case warranted no further attention from the courts. Yet,
several witnesses whose testimony was excluded from judicial considera-
tion contested Darden's guilt. The exculpatory evidence was never
weighed, because the Governor of Florida relied on the accuracy of the
legal system to justify a denial of clemency. Darden died in Florida's elec-
tric chair in March of 1988, another victim of the demise of mercy.7 3
C. Systemic Impact of Racism
Apparently pleased with its handiwork in shaping an innovative capital
punishment jurisprudence for the nation, the Gregg plurality announced
that "[n]o longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death
sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines ...
[T]he concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to
any significant degree ' 74 in the new procedures. The reality is that the
death penalty in the United States is not evenly applied to defendants of
different races,7 5 and this inequity has made the need for mercy all the
more acute. The Supreme Court has held that evidence of structural racial
disparity cannot invalidate capital sentences.7 ' Therefore, only a sentenc-
ing authority outside of the court system can exercise merciful discretion
on the basis of systemic racial discrimination.7
D. Absence of Proportionality Review
The capital punishment bureaucracy has few mechanisms to check its
own systemic excesses. Most state supreme courts do not evaluate the ap-
propriateness of sentences in terms of the punishment meted out to simi-
larly-situated prisoners. The United States Supreme Court, in Pulley v.
Harris,7 ' ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not require such propor-
tionality review of capital sentences by state supreme courts. Many state
supreme courts that do review for proportionality do not look at the
sentences imposed on all those convicted of similar crimes, but only at
sentences in which death was the penalty.79 This practice, which is simply
legal system that aspires to accuracy.
73. See The Symbolic Death of Willie Darden, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 28, 1988, at 9.
74. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).
75. See generally W. BOWERS, supra note 17, at 193-269 (statistical probability of imposition of
death penalty increases if defendant black, also increases if victim white); Bruck, supra note 3, at 18
(race of both criminal and victim large factor in determining whether murderer is executed).
76. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (statistics showing systemically discriminatory im-
pact of capital sentencing procedures do not invalidate death penalty in any particular case).
77. Although mercy is inherently individualized and discretionary, it is certainly appropriate to
take into consideration the more global forces that brought a particular person to a death sentence. If
one of those forces is systemic racial disparity in capital sentencing, such disparity is rightfully one
part of the mercy calculus.
78. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
79. See Tabak, supra note 24, at 823-25.
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an attempt to locate any similar crime for which a death sentence was
imposed (as opposed to an evaluation of the proportionality of the entire
pool of sentences for similar crimes), amounts to a "precedent-seeking ex-
ercise"8 that cannot correct sentencing disparities.81 Thus, the lack of ad-
equate proportionality review combines with the disappearance of mercy
to allow executions to go forward without any decision-maker ever having
evaluated the relative appropriateness of a particular sentence of death.
E. The Death Penalty Bureaucracy
Mercy's demise reflects the increasing depersonalization and bureaucra-
tization of our culture. Ralph Hummel, in his critique of the bureaucratic
society, notes that "bureaucrats are asked to take their guiding values
from a reservoir of norms designed by the bureaucratic system. When
these come into conflict with personal norms, ... the personal norms
.. .must be sacrificed."82 When courts instruct jurors to ignore mercy,
sympathy, and sentiment in sentencing others to die, and when governors
rely exclusively on the judicial system in reviewing those sentences, capital
punishment truly becomes a bureaucracy of death, with internally-
imposed norms and without personal reflection. 3 This bureaucratization
affords everyone involved in capital sentencing the illusion that no one has
decided that any given individual should die; in doing so, it poses the
question whether we want a "headless and soulless" 84 institution sending
people to their deaths.
8 5
Max Weber, then, was right: the impassive, rationalistic impulse of bu-
reaucracy is inexorable," even in death. The element of mercy is being
squeezed out of capital punishment in the United States by a death pen-
alty bureaucracy. The decision-makers in that system either cannot or are
not exercising a merciful discretion to forgo the death penalty; jurors in-
creasingly are prohibited from being merciful, and governors have shied
away from the opportunity to be merciful. What this Note proposes in
80. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at 90.
81. But see Pulley, 465 U.S. at 72-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that proportionality
review reduces some irrationality in sentencing).
82. R. HUMMEL, THE BUREAUCRATIC EXPERIENCE 7 (2d ed. 1982).
83. The elimination of mercy from capital punishment resembles a process of reification, where
"human beings so lose consciousness of their potential and their past as creators that they treat their
social institutions as if they had a life of their own above and beyond human control." Id. at 41.
84. Id. at 3.
85. For example, it is clearly in the interest of the prosecutor to have a jury see a defendant as a
bureaucratic case, a matter to be processed and put in the "out" box. Robert Weisberg recounts a
tactic used by California prosecutors to ease jurors' qualms about the death penalty: Prosecutors argue
that voting to impose the death penalty is part of the jurors' legal duty, as opposed to a moral choice.
The aggravating and mitigating factors then become part of a legal arithmetic and can simply be
added up to determine a sentence. See Weisberg, supra note 30, at 375-79.
86. See M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956-1005 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968) (dis-
cussing irresistible advance of bureaucracy through all social institutions).
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response to these developments is the rejuvenation of mercy in several
areas.
IV. REVIVING MERCY
Mercy can be returned to the capital punishment system by all three
branches of government, or any one of them.87 Courts, legislatures, and
governors can all take simple, concrete steps to preserve the possibility of
mercy within the structure of the death penalty.,
A. Judicial Implementation of Mercy
Apart from affirmatively instructing juries that they may be merciful,
which the Supreme Court conceivably could prohibit under California v.
Brown's admonishment to avoid "extraneous emotional factors"89 in capi-
tal trials, trial courts could encourage mercy by refraining from giving any
instruction whatsoever concerning mercy. Silence about mercy would en-
sure that mitigating background and character evidence introduced by de-
fendants would not necessarily be disregarded as irrelevant sympathetic
factors,90 and would make certain that Lockett v. Ohio's mandate to allow
juries in death penalty cases to consider "any aspect of a defendant's char-
acter or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the de-
fendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death"91 is not violated.
This silence would also align death penalty sentencing jurisprudence with
the legal doctrine concerning jury nullification: jurors would not be told
they could be merciful, but no court officer would be allowed to tell them
not to consider mercy.92 Abstaining from anti-mercy instructions would
have the double virtue of preserving merciful discretion while vesting that
discretion in the community sentiment93 embodied by juries, which serve
at least in part to validate the outcomes of the criminal justice system.
87. Although the tradition of mercy is rooted in the executive clemency power, it would not be
inappropriate for other governmental actors to implement mercy. The nation's governors have no
special purchase on compassion and empathy. Indeed, fellow-feeling may be more accurately captured
in the sentiments of unelected citizens serving on juries or clemency boards, than in the politically-
bounded perspectives of governors.
88. Of course, it may be that it is impossible for a society to retain the death penalty and yet claim
the adjective "merciful": for some decision-maker truly to come to terms with another human's life
and then decide to kill that person seems incongruous at best.
89. 479 U.S. 538, 543 (1987).
90. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Brown, 479 U.S. at 553-55, for a discussion of the effects of
anti-mercy instructions on jurors' consideration of background and character evidence.
91. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (footnote omitted).
92. The Supreme Court has upheld the refusal of a trial judge to inform the jury that it possessed
the authority to nullify laws through its verdict. Juries nevertheless possess the de facto power to
nullify putative sentences by absolving defendants of guilt. See generally Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury
Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 56-63 (Autumn
1980) (history of jury nullification).
93. Although at present there is strong popular support in the abstract for the death penalty as a
punishment, juror sentiment regarding the death penalty as punishment for a particular individual
may vary widely, especially given informal and intuitive bases (such as mercy) for deciding the
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B. Legislative Implementation
State and Federal legislatures can encourage mercy by amending death
penalty statutes to require explicitly that sentencers take mercy into con-
sideration. 4 Such an approach, however, might also be held unconstitu-
tional under Brown.95
The most effective legislative implementation of mercy would insulate
the other possible source of mercy-executive clemency-from political
pressures. A statutory enactment or constitutional amendment, depending
on the legislative source of the clemency power itself, could vest the sole
discretion to be merciful in state clemency boards,9" similar to those al-
ready existing in four states, yet constituted so as to avoid the problems
of bureaucratization and politicization.
These clemency boards should have a small membership, no more than
a half-dozen. Their members should be selected from the general popula-
tion by the governor and should serve lengthy, staggered terms. No mem-
ber should serve for more than one term. The boards' authority should be
limited to determining whether death sentences imposed should be carried
out or commuted to life sentences. Furthermore, governors in their ap-
pointments should strive to keep a balance of viewpoints on the board. 8
Because, unlike a jury, mercy recommendations would not be required to
be unanimous, all boards could include some members who uncondition-
ally oppose the death penalty. The clemency boards should be required to
report the basis for their invoking or disdaining mercy in each case, not in
the form of "reasons" for their decision, but rather in the form of a dis-
cussion of the equities of the penalty imposed.9
This legislative proposal would free the mercy decision from the con-
straints of politics, while retaining some accountability in the clemency
process. Because no single governor would be responsible for appointing
all members of the board, the board would not be beholden to a particular
political program. The requirement that members' terms not be renewable
would help ensure that clemency boards would not become entrenched
sentence.
94. A historical example of such a statute is discussed supra note 18.
95. 479 U.S. at 543.
96. An important feature of this proposal is the removal of clemency authority from the ultimate
control of governors; experience reveals that if clemency boards make only recommendations of clem-
ency, governors may still feel compelled by political pressures to refuse clemency. See, e.g., Louisiana
Orders Execution Stayed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1988, at A17, col. 1 (Louisiana pardon board recom-
mended mercy for Herbert Welcome, but outgoing governor refused to act on recommendation).
97. Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, and Utah. See supra note 16.
98. The composition of Connecticut's Board of Pardons might serve as a model. It is composed of
five members who serve six-year terms. The membership is appointed by the governor and must
consist of two lawyers, one physician, and one social scientist; no more than two of these members
may belong to the same political party. The membership also includes one judge of the state supreme
court. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-24a (1985).
99. Thus, clemency boards' merciful discretion would be limited in that they would have to ac-
count publicly for the decisions they reach.
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bureaucracies and would regularly bring fresh perspectives to boards' con-
versations about mercy.
Although certainly no panacea for the inequities of the death penalty,
clemency boards would meet a number of the needs for mercy. First, the
constitutional imperative of substantive clemency review would be met.
Because of their insulation from political considerations, clemency boards
would be able to contemplate factors in mitigation that the judicial system
could not or would not consider. The ability of clemency boards to collect
state-wide data on the imposition of the death penalty would allow them
to mitigate death sentences in cases where racism, unconscious or other-
wise, had played a part in sentencing (for example, where it happened
that the victim and the jury members were white and the defendant was
black). Further, clemency boards would be able to use their statistical in-
formation to conduct true proportionality reviews of sentences, comparing
each death sentence to the sentences received by all persons convicted of
similar crimes. Finally, the explicit task of clemency boards would be to
review for mercy, thus helping to prevent further bureaucratization of the
death penalty."' 0
C. Gubernatorial Implementation
Governors may unilaterally or together with boards of pardons, if any,
act to restore mercy through an active use of the executive clemency
power. An engaged approach to mercy would require governors to em-
brace personal decision-making based on factors that are not purely ra-
tional-to consult "experience, emotion, introspection and conversa-
tion" 10 -in thinking about executive clemency. 0 2 This approach would
look much like the way people make important choices in their personal
lives.1 03
100. Because mercy must encompass arbitrariness and subjectivity, see supra note 5, clemency
boards would not necessarily have a pro-mercy bias. Any predilection would have to come from indi-
vidual board members' intuitions and feelings, as opposed to structural (and therefore bureaucratic)
biases toward mercy.
101. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 56 (1984).
Rejecting both nihilism and rationalism as ways of making decisions in favor of what he calls pragma-
tism or irrationalism, Singer argues that "[w]e do not have a rational foundation and method for legal
or moral reasoning. . .; we do not, however, need such a foundation or method to develop passionate
commitments and to make our lives meaningful." Id. at 5 n.8. Rational decision procedures for an-
swering the moral question of whether a prisoner should pay with his life for a crime necessarily
embody a prior moral or political choice and are therefore neither determinate, objective, or neutral.
Id. at 9-47, 59 n.170. The idea of mercy thus fits well into an irrational perspective, as mercy is not
usually defined as having a rational or consistent basis for its exercise. See supra note 5.
102. An early Maine statute regulating the clemency process was aimed in part at achieving such
an engaged approach by allowing the governor time to reflect on the equities of each death sentence
and to evaluate the possibility of rehabilitating the condemned. Act of Mar. 29, 1837, ch. 292, 1837
Me. Laws 446. The statute required that the record of each capital case be sent to the governor, and
required that no clemency decision be made for one year after sentencing, during which time the
convict was to be in solitary confinement at hard labor. See also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAw 282 & n.6 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing Maine statute).
103. Singer maintains that people making such personal decisions:
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It may be that most, or even all, governors may already engage actively
in the process of granting clemency, although the stinginess of post-Gregg
mercy would seem to belie that conclusion. °' Further, the idea that gov-
ernors and other clemency-granting authorities should take a more vigor-
ous approach to clemency does not imply that justice can be tempered
with mercy simply by multiplying procedural requirements designed to
force such authorities to confront the clemency decision.105 The real im-
port of this proposal lies in clemency authorities' assumption of responsi-
bility for the achievement of justice and mercy (as opposed merely to pro-
cedural due process) within their jurisdictions, and in their willingness to
wrestle personally with the moral problems posed by the death penalty.
Governors and pardon boards who wish to be merciful finally must be
unwilling to allow courts "authoritative-seeming pronouncements to si-
lence disputatious conversation" 1  about the morality of death
sentences.1
0 7
V. CONCLUSION: THE MIRROR OF MERCY
How we deal with what is worst in us, our propensity to kill each
other, is in reality a mirror of what can be best in us, our social vision.
The fate of mercy in the imposition of capital punishment reflects the kind
of society we live in; the "kinder, gentler"' 08 impulses embodied by mercy
think long and hard about what they want in life; they imagine what their lives would be like
if they were to follow one path rather than another; they talk with the people who are most
important to them and whose opinions they value; they argue with others and with themselves;
and in the end, they make a decision.
Singer, supra note 101, at 62.
104. One governor who did attempt to integrate "experience, emotion, introspection, and conver-
sation" into his thinking about mercy was Michael DiSalle, Governor of Ohio from 1959 to 1963.
Though opposed to capital punishment, Gov. DiSalle felt that he would be violating his oath to
uphold the laws of Ohio if he granted clemency in all cases. M. DISALLE, THE POWER OF LIFE OR
DEATH 5 (1965). He took his mercy prerogative seriously, however, and commuted the sentences of
six of the 12 people scheduled to die during his term. DiSalle expended considerable effort trying to
come to a thoughtful decision about clemency: He read trial transcripts, he visited crime scenes, he
asked the state police to investigate unresolved issues, he talked to psychiatrists and to accomplices and
spouses of the condemned, and he personally interviewed and reinterviewed prisoners who had been
sentenced to death. See id. at 27-117. DiSalle relates little about his decisional processes in his book
on clemency, but it is clear that, through these personal, detailed investigations, he was striving to
come to an irrational, pragmatic, informed sense of practice in making decisions about mercy. See also
E. BROWN, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR'S EDUCATION ON DEATH Row
(1989) (discussing personal dilemmas and political difficulties faced by California Governor Edmund
"Pat" Brown in deciding clemency appeals); Lewis, He Was Their Last Resort, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20,
1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 7, col. 1 (reviewing PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY) ("Governor
Brown dealt with every case in [a] particularized way, putting a heavy burden on himself.").
105. But see Note, supra note 2, at 905-11 (advocating increased procedural guarantees in clem-
ency proceedings to provide more accurate information to clemency authorities).
106. R. BURT, supra note 30, at 164.
107. Admittedly, such an engagement in the clemency process would require opposing prevailing
public opinion. But some governors, including Hugh Carey and Mario Cuomo of New York, have
blocked executions during their tenures without suffering defeat at the polls.
108. Transcript of Bush Speech Accepting Nomination for President, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19,
1988, at A14, col. 1.
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unfortunately have been dissipated by political and bureaucratic pressures
favoring executions. Yet, choosing whether another is to live or die is a
disturbing and daunting moral challenge. This decision should not be
made purely by following rules or by weighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Rational decision procedures imply that no one has really
made a choice, 09 and that implication is one which is not acceptable in a
supposedly moral society. Empathy and emotion are properly injected into
decisions about capital punishment. For mercy to survive in the United
States, leaders in the several institutions of public life will have to take
immediate action. If they do, we may find that mercy, sentiment, sympa-
thy, empathy, and emotion are worthy mirrors of our better selves.
109. Robert Weisberg observes: "In the case of the death penalty, the law has sometimes offered
the sentencer the illusion of a legal rule, so that no actor at any point in the penalty procedure need
feel he has chosen to kill any individual." Weisberg, supra note 30, at 393.
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